Monday, July 21, 2014

The Atlantic's View of Polls Doesn't Make Any Sense

Photo Credit: David Shankbone via Wikimedia Commons

The Atlantic's Derek Thompson provides us with the predictably provocative headline, "Millennials' Political Views Don't Make Any Sense". In case we're easily offended, the tag line reassures: "That's not a harsh description. It's just a fair description."

This would be hardly surprising news. Most people aren't political analysts, and many are only casually interested in politics. Worse still, you could probably show that even most politicians have views that are not totally coherent, artfully crafted as they may be. (Barack Obama's pre-2012 views on gay marriage never had a semblance of logical consistency.) And as the youngest voting block, it wouldn't be surprising that the under-30-year-olds would have a less than stellar grasp of the major issues facing society.

So I was actually pretty surprised to find that Thompson doesn't prove his case at all. Not even close. I'll take the evidence he offers in turn.
[Millennials are] for smaller government, unless budget cuts scratch a program they've heard of. They'd like Washington to fix everything, just so long as it doesn't run anything.
These are obviously broad summaries, and come from a poll done by the Reason Foundation, hardly an unassailable source. Even still, as broad summaries, the views aren't totally incoherent. It's reasonable to say that you think the government should be smaller, but it should preserve programs that you're familiar with. And it's not a crazy idea that Washington could offer a lot of solutions to various problems without taking over anything in particular.

Consider next what Thompson calls a "smorgasbord of paradoxes":
  • Millennials hate the political parties more than everyone else, but they have the highest opinion of Congress.
  • Young people are the most likely to be single parents and the least likely to approve of single parenthood.
  • Young people voted overwhelmingly for Obama when he promised universal health care, but they oppose his universal health care law as much as the rest of the country ... even though they still pledge high support for universal health care. (Like other groups, but more so: They seem allergic to the term Obamacare.)
Not one of these is a paradox. You could think that political parties are a really bad force in politics, but that the individuals who make up the congress are on a whole doing better than the country seems to think. You could think that single parenthood is bad, but still end up as a single parent; more plausibly, the group of individuals who are the single parents could be quite distinct from the group who think single parenthood is bad. And you can support universal healthcare, but not think that Obamacare is the best way to achieve it. This last view is not only coherent, but it also seems to be the correct position to hold.

In fact, Thompson acknowledges that some of these views can be coherent. He writes:
... you can technically support (a) reducing the overall tax burden and (b) raising taxes on the wealthy by raising the investment tax and absolving the bottom 50 percent of Social Security taxes. Somehow, I think what's happening is simpler than young people doing the long math of effective tax rates. I think they're just confused.
You don't need to do math to see that reducing overall taxes and raising the portion paid by the rich is possible. It's possible on its face. Instead of realizing this, Thompson informs us that it's already his opinion that they're confused. I would be interested in whatever led him to that conclusion, rather than this series of pseudo paradoxes.

This is also strange:
Perhaps it should be [confusing] when we're using a couple thousand subjects to guess the collective opinions of 86 million people. 
As far as I know, that's generally how polling works. As far as sample sizes go, 2000 is pretty impressive. As long as they were selected with sufficient randomness, there's good reason to think the poll is representative.
Millennials are more liberal than the rest of the country, particularly on social issues, but they get more economically conservative when they make more money. 
This is not surprise, nor is it divergent from larger trends. It is also not incoherent.
  • On spending:
    Conservatives can say: 65 percent of Millennials would like to cut spending.
    Liberals can say: 62 percent would like to spend more on infrastructure and jobs.
  • On taxes:
    Conservatives can say: 58 percent of Millennials want to cut taxes overall.
    Liberals can say: 66 percent want to raise taxes on the wealthy.
  • On government's role in our lives:
    Conservatives can say: 66 percent of Millennials say that "when something is funded by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful."
    Liberals can say: More than two-thirds think the government should guarantee food, shelter, and a living wage.
  • On government size:
    Conservatives can say: 57 percent want smaller government with fewer services (if you mention the magic word "taxes").
    Liberals can say: 54 percent want larger government with more services (if you don't mention "taxes").
Let's take this in turn.

On spending: You can cut total spending and spend more on infrastructure and jobs.

On taxes: You can cut taxes overall and raise taxes on the wealthy.

On government's role in our lives: You can think that the government is often inefficient and wasteful, but that we still need it to ensure a certain baseline welfare standard. Even if a service is provided inefficiently, it's likely still better that it's provided at all.

On government size: Now, there are ways to expand the government without raising taxes. You could simply grow the economy (and thus revenue), or raise deficit spending for a while.  However, I acknowledge that these postulations would be a stretch to make these views look consistent.

Fortunately, there's no need to make these views consistent. If 57% of millennials believe in smaller government when taxes are mentioned, and 54% believe in bigger government without taxes being mentioned (and we assume that bigger government means higher taxes), then only an overlapping 11% of people need to have incoherent views (probably a bit more, given that some people decline to answer). But if 11% of millennials have incoherent views, does that justify the assertion that millennials' political views make no sense? Of course not. Only a minority of them demonstrably have views that make no sense.

And once we realize this, the entire argument looks silly. Even if a majority can be found to assent to each of two conflicting views, this only implies that a small minority have irrational views. 

As I said, I wouldn't be surprised if many millennials had a very confused political views. I would be surprised, rather, if they didn't. But I think this would hold across generations, and is to some extent a mundane fact. It's quite fashionable to complain and criticize millennials, but little of the work that does bothers to actually compare them to any other group.
 

Wednesday, July 2, 2014

Life without procreating: child-less or child-free?

Photo Credit: Alejandro Hernandez via Flickr
In recent years, there's been a growing movement of individuals who proudly claim a lack of desire to procreate.

This lack of desire takes many forms. Some are merely ambivalent, and figure that in the face of ambivalence, it is best to err on the side of not creating unwanted life. Others believe that they would not be good with children, or simply wish not to have children.

Some are persuaded by moral arguments, which can also take a variety of forms. Arguments concerning the use of resources or the distribution of goods in the world may count in favor of those in particular places in society refraining from reproduction in specific circumstances, but do not offer a universal prescription. Alternatively, some writers, such as Seana Shiffrin and David Benatar, argue that in most imaginable cases, it is wrong to bring another person into existence. Some such beliefs may underlie the motives of those at the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement.

Regardless of our opinion on the more hard-line arguments, there appear to be some compelling reasons for many people in wealthy nations to reduce or forgo their procreative intentions. Most notably, additional individuals in wealthy nations increase the environmental burdens that these societies place on the planet. And our the resultant obligations we would have to our children greatly reduce out capacity to fulfill our obligations to those who already exist, especially the worst-off among us. It is thus better to never bring these countervailing obligations into existence, if we can.

Note, importantly, that the reasons we have not to bring and individual into existence do not equally count in favor or killing or neglecting already existing individuals, including those we might already have brought into existence.

Photo Credit: WikiMedia Commons
Those people who choose to live their lives without procreating often refer to themselves or their lifestyle as "child-free." However, as Christine Overall points out in Why Have Children?, this terminology carries a regrettable negative connotation.

Consider how the suffix -free is most often used. "Cancer-free." "Debt-free." "Drug-free." These terms carry with them the implication that what one is free from is some kind of burden or unwelcome element. Since "child" describes a class of persons, the implication that they are a burden to be free from is hardly appropriate. We would never say of a parent with children who do not have any disabilities that they are "disability-free."

In place of this term, Overall uses the term "childless." But unfortunately, this term also feels inadequate. The suffix -less carries the reverse implications of -free. It suggests that what is lacked is to be missed. Think of "homeless," "restless," "hopeless." In the case of childless, it implies that there is something missing from a life without children.

But this is what many of those who choose not to have children dispute. Life can be fulfilling, rewarding, and meaningful without choosing to reproduce and without raising children.

In light of this impasse, it's preferable to eschew both terms, and use the neutral phrase "without children" or "those without children." Unfortunately, like many an apt phrasing, it is clunky and unpoetic. But it is better to be seen as a poor writer than to imply objectionable attitudes.

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Can corporations have religious beliefs?

Photo Credit: AnarchyArt666 via deviantART

The recent Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby ruling has aroused a lot of anger, and has jump-started some liberal rhetoric about corporate personhood.

As an advocate of birth control, I find this ruling disappointing. I would certainly prefer for more women and men to have broader access to birth control, better management of their reproductive lives, and overall greater autonomy. Hopefully, we will find methods to pursue these values despite the outcome of this case.

But while I share these sentiments with many other Americans on the left of the political spectrum, I do not agree with many of the arguments against this ruling. For example, much of John Oliver's complaints here are against the notion of corporate personhood:


Central to much of the critique of the the ruling is the claim that corporations cannot have religious beliefs (Matt Yglesias provides excellent context on why this is misguided). Indeed, many argue that corporations cannot have beliefs at all.

This is wrong. Corporations, and any group of individuals with a regulated decision-making method, can have both acts and beliefs, and indeed, religious beliefs.

Phillip Pettit is well-known from his work on this topic, and has described the following illustrative example. Imagine three people, A, B and C, working as a committee to hire a new lawyer. The group has determines that the individual they hire must have both extensive knowledge of law and impressive credentials in the field. After interviewing a candidate, they might conclude as follows:

Committee Member A: The candidate has both extensive knowledge and impressive credentials.
Committee Member B: The candidate has extensive knowledge but does not have impressive credentials.
Committee Member C: The candidate does not have extensive knowledge, but does have impressive credentials.

If they were all to vote on whether or not the individuals ought to be hired, it would be two to one ruling "No." But their decision structure might require that they each vote only on whether or not the candidate meets their criteria. Since two believe the candidate is extensively knowledgable and two believe the credentials are impressive, as a group they would believe the candidate is a good fit.

In this way, and others, corporations can have views that are distinct from the people that constitute them, and take actions that are not properly thought of as merely the actions of individuals. Since actions can be in keeping with or depart from religious tenets, and a corporation's actions will be shaped by its beliefs, it follows that a corporations can have religious beliefs.

Even without this technical analysis, I think we already know that corporations can have beliefs. Sometimes they choose to make part of their mission not just the pursuit of shareholder value, but respect for the environment, or respect for their employees. As Oliver points out above, Hobby Lobby appears to act in certain ways that reflect specific moral beliefs, like contributing to charity and paying workers substantially above the minimum wage.

Liberals should be very cautious if they want to claim that corporations cannot have beliefs. I think this line of reasoning can undermine efforts to argue that corporations can and should have greater regard for social goods.

And even though corporations can have religious beliefs, it is a separate question about to what extent the government must protect these beliefs. The jurisprudence that exists on the extent of the First Amendment mostly assumes that the subjects of protection are human individuals. Since this law is developed through consideration of the probable consequences of applying the principle, it must be re-thought when applied to the protection of corporate religious beliefs. It is plausible that the religious freedom of constitutions ought to be subject to more restrictions than that of individuals, given the public interests at stake.

However, this ruling does point out some of the problematic complexity inherent in the Affordable Care Act. Using regulations to force companies to do what could be done better by the government inevitably will bring up legal challenges and conflicting interests such as those described in this case.

Of course, it is foolish to suggest that the details of a government-based health care system wouldn't also be rife with controversy.


Monday, June 23, 2014

Who should pay for dinner?


Photo Credit: Robert Donovan /Flickr

I confess straightaway that I am not an expert in etiquette. However, I was truly puzzled by some of the points made by Troy Patterson in his recent advice column at Slate.

First, he claimed that in the context of romantic dating, whoever asks for the date should pick up the check. I hesitate to disagree, though this practice has not been a habit of mine, but Patterson's reasoning for this conclusion is wholly unpersuasive. He writes: 'If P asks Q out to dinner, P is inherently announcing the intent to take Q out: “May I take you out to dinner?”'

If this were the right translation, I'd have to agree. If you offer to pay for someone's dinner,and they accept, that gives you pretty good reason to pay for their dinner. But asking someone out to dinner in no way implies you want to take them out to dinner. It only means you want to go out to dinner with them., which is not at all the same thing. Primarily, the difference between taking someone out to dinner and going out to dinner with someone is that in the first instance, you fund the evening. Patterson has equivocated between these two distinct notions and failed to make a substantive point.

More confusingly, he insists that when groups go out to dinner, they should either split the check up evenly, or not at all (that is, one person should end up paying.) This is mistaken for several reasons.

One reason is that it need not be a complicated mess to split up a check, as Patterson implies. Many restaurants, including one of my favorites, will often split up a check by seat, making it quite easy for each guest to pay their fair share. If you know a restaurant does not do this, you can always ask for separate checks at the outset (which can also be helpful when certain individuals leave earlier than others).

This approach might be disfavored because it is burdensome to the waitstaff. This is unfortunate, but I doubt it is overly onerous. Perhaps it just calls for a slightly higher tip. After all, you don't get paid to do anything because it's easy. And it would also be easier for waitstaff to group my check together with the strangers sitting next to me--this doesn't mean there's good reason to do it.

So there is a viable alternative to Patterson's prescription. There is also a huge pitfall with his approach. He says that we shouldn't be to worried about paying more than our fair share every now and then, because in the end it ought to even out. And if it's not evening out, we should ostracize those who overindulge.

This, however, is unnecessary. Some people simply require more calories than others, and some enjoy more expensive drinks and entrees. There's no reason that these differences should dictate friendship groupings, especially when there is an easy solution.

Even worse, the fact of splitting a check up evenly might induce each individual to spend more than they otherwise would. Since each extra drink or appetizer only adds marginally to one's financially obligation (since the cost of each is divided among all the attendees) , everyone is incentivized to over-consume. In the end, everyone is paying more than they would have had they paid for their own meals. And they probably will have more booze and food than would be optimal.

This collective action problem can be easily fixed through coordinated agreements. But since the goal is to have fun with friends, no one really wants to say "Let's all try and make sure the bill doesn't get out of hand." This seems to defeat the whole purpose of having etiquette, anyway.

Patterson may be right about what the etiquette, in fact, entails in these cases. Social mores are complex and nuanced, and are not always completely rational (just consider gift-giving). But I think we often should change them, if we can, to be more rational than the status quo.

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Slate doesn't understand what offensive speech is


Over at The New York Times, Jeremy Peters has an interesting article on the decline of the word 'homosexual' as self-description by those who identify as gay or lesbian. In the header of the article we are also told that "for many gays and lesbians, the term 'homosexual' is flinch-worthy."

In response, Slate's J. Bryan Lowder contested the thrust of Peters' piece. Most critically, Lowder writes of Peters' article, "let's not get in the habit of letting the overseers at GLAAD, on whose authority this article hinges, rescind access to words that really are innocuous." Unfortunately for Lowder's case, Peters does not at all hinge his authority on GLAAD.

GLAAD is brought up as an example of an advocacy group that finds "homosexual" to be an offensive term. Other reasons suggested for disfavoring the term include:

  • It contains the syllables "homo" (a common anti-gay slur) and "sex" (which puts more emphasis on the sexual aspects of gay life than might be desirable)
  • It invokes a period of time in which "homosexuality" was a mental illness
  • "Homosexual" is the term of choice for most anti-gay groups
To this last point, Lowder argues that we shouldn't let the Rush Limbaugh's of the world determine what words we use. But this objection gets to the heart of Lowder's confusion. The New York Times' article was not meant to forbid use of a word or declare it a slur. It was exploring a position taken by many gay advocates, and explaining the way words are used and the choices behind them.

Sometimes it is not immediately obvious why we choose the words we use, but these reasons can be revealed to us. When this happens, we discover that a word had connotations we did not expect. Peters uses this example: consider the phrases "homosexual activist", "homosexual community", and "homosexual marriage." Few gay advocates would ever use these phrases; I know I would not. There is a pejorative ring to each phrase, which disappears as soon as "homosexual" is replaced with "gay". This suggests that "homosexual" carries more negative connotations than we might have initially realized.

It's clear that Lowder does not appreciate that this is the level of analysis at which the NYT piece is working, because he writes, "As a member of The Community in Question, I’m willing to grant you...permission to use homosexual when the occasion calls for it." Even if this is meant as a joke, it shows that he misses the point. We don't avoid slurs because we lack permission from a particular community, we avoid using them because they carry connotations and implications that are damaging to the individuals in question. Words our powerful because the shape our shared understanding of the world, so we should choose the words we use wisely.

Making this about the author's identity, in this case, was unnecessary. It's fine if Lowder wants to share the fact that the word "homosexual" does not offend him--but this does not support his thesis. People of any community will have a variety of reactions to a word, but this is not the sole determinate of a word's status as a slur.

There are a few reasons to question Peters' analysis. One is that "homosexuality" serves as a useful term for which "gayness" is an awkward substitute.  And second, it seems "homosexual" is an appropriate word to keep around to describe the same-sex sexual behavior of non-human animals. (However, this second point might actually bolster the Peters' understanding, as in this context it would likely be exclusively used as an adjective, rather than as a noun.)

But I would not be surprised at all if "homosexual" went the way of the term "oriental." This, in my opinion, is likely a better parallel to draw than to analogize "homosexual" with a really hateful term like "fag". "Oriental" was never exclusively a hateful term, but it represented a very misguided and deficient understanding of a group of people. If it is heard these days, it is not necessarily perceived as an insult, but it is more likely seen as an outdated and inappropriate term for a group of people. So too, I believe, we can plausibly that "homosexual" will one day share a similar status.